author: Irina Yershova-Babenko
Relevance of the research. In today's world, where gender equality is becoming an ethical and legal imperative, legal philosophy needs to integrate the phenomenon of imagination as a tool for legitimizing the social contract and deconstructing patriarchal norms. Traditional theories (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Habermas) model imagination to justify power and human rights, but ignore its gender dimension, where the authority of the first person (FPA) opposes binary stereotypes, colonial narratives, and violence against subjectivity. In the Ukrainian context, against the backdrop of European integration and military challenges, gender politics is transforming the legal paradigm: from combating stereotypes in legislation to philosophical and legal studies of equality (for example, M. I. Krochuk's dissertation on gender parity). However, the problem of imagination as a resource for decolonizing norms and multiple identities in the philosophy of law remains underdeveloped, despite the growing attention to gender law in the NAU and academic circles. This study fills this gap by proposing a model of legal protection where respect for imagination ensures the decolonization of norms, the expansion of human rights, and the counteraction of patriarchy, contributing to the evolution of Ukrainian legislation in the context of global identity crises and national reforms.
Problem statement. In the philosophy of law, imagination serves as a fundamental mechanism for legitimizing the social contract, modeling the natural state and voluntary renunciation of freedoms for the sake of order, as described by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jürgen Habermas. This mental construct not only justifies the authority of the state and its monopoly on violence, but also ensures the inviolability of human rights through the principle of reciprocity: to renounce some of one's rights and be satisfied with the degree of freedom in relation to other people that mirrors the degree that one would allow other people to have in relation to oneself [1]. At the same time, imagination is revealed as the ethical basis of gender self-identification, where the authority of the first person (FPA), from Descartes and Husserl to Davidson, guarantees unmistakable access to subjective experiences, transforming gender into an imaginary construct that opposes binary social norms. The problem arises at the intersection of such traditions: patriarchal societies impose stereotypical roles through collective imagination, excluding marginalized subjects (in particular women and gender non-conforming individuals) from the processes of norm creation, which leads to ethical violence against subjectivity. This raises the question: how can imagination transform gender norms by integrating first-person authority (FPA) into human rights protection and expanding the social contract to include multiple identities and legitimizing self-identity solely on the basis of a person's subjective assessment (self-identification) of their own identity? Historical examples (burunshi in Albania, duality in Sparta) and feminist strategies (Kukayne's dendrofeminism, Richardson-Self's social representations) testify to the potential of imagination for decolonization, but the lack of theoretical integration in the philosophy of law hinders legal evolution. This article analyzes this mechanism, proposing imagination as an imperative of equality and freedom.
Analysis of recent research and publications. The article draws on the classical tradition of social contract theory in defining the sociocultural aspects of the phenomenon of imagination in the context of human rights protection: Hobbes describes the natural state as “war of all against all,” where imagination models the monster Leviathan to legitimize the state. Locke argues against this, imagining a peaceful state with the preservation of rights, transferring only the administration of justice to the state. Rousseau sees the contract as a transfer of rights to the sovereign community. Habermas develops this through discourse without coercion. Contemporary works integrate the phenomenon of gender: Roelof analyzes imagination as a barrier to empathic understanding of gender experience, emphasizing “simulation trouble”; Logue proposes “gender fictionalism,” where belief in gender is self-sufficient, providing first-person authority (FPA), which can be traced from Descartes (“cogito ergo sum”) to Husserl (Evidenz) and Davidson (the authority of mental states without evidence). In turn, Decomb criticizes the phenomenon of first-person authority through the argument about the absence of a referent in one's own “I”: “What is first-person authority connected with? From the point of view of the philosophy of consciousness, its source is the infallibility of internal perception. According to the grammatical philosophy of mind, this infallibility is contrived, since there is no one who could be mistaken, because “I” is not a name, ‘I’ has no referent” [3, pp. 16-26]. Feminist studies (Richardson-Self, Cooke, Olufemi) emphasize the decolonization of norms through “social imaginaries” and “feral intimacy.” A group of Polish researchers focuses on modeling scenarios of gender norms in the digital sphere, taking into account the equality of subjects guaranteed by law and the cultural transformations of the present day (the emergence of social media) using the Delphi+ method [9]. An Italian researcher of feminist imagination focuses on the transformative power of art and its influence on learning and pedagogical practices, and how such inclusive practices change established norms and approaches, including in human rights protection (gender aspect) [10]. Sh. FitzGerald and A. Carline, researchers from Edinburgh, Scotland, propose ideas of gender justice in human rights protection, where imagination is a tool for overcoming sociocultural barriers [7]. Unfortunately, in Ukrainian legal philosophy research circles, the issue of imagination in the context of human rights protection does not receive adequate attention.
Research task. To consider imagination as a key resource of philosophy of law: from the constitution of the social contract (Hobbes–Habermas) to the deconstruction of gender norms through FPA and feminist approaches. To analyze the intersection of identity, human rights, and imagination, to prove the priority of subjective self-determination over biology, to propose a model for gender equality as a human rights imperative.
Main material presentation. Imagination is considered a fundamental tool in the philosophy of law and gender studies, serving as the basis of the social contract - from Hobbes (state of nature as war, denial of freedoms according to the Leviathan model), Locke (peaceful state with minimal transfer of rights to the state) and Rousseau (transfer of rights to the sovereign-community) to Habermas (communicative discourse for consensus). In the context of gender, imagination deconstructs patriarchal norms, legitimizing gender identity through first-person authority (FPA, from Descartes to Davidson). Gender is treated as a “fiction” (according to Logie), where subjective self-determination takes precedence over biology, and historical examples (Sparta, Albanian Buruneshi) prove its social nature. Feminist approaches (Roelofs, Richardson-Self, Kukaine's dendrofeminism) use imagination to resist stereotypes and decolonize norms.
Conclusions. The study proposes a human rights model where respect for imagination ensures a plurality of identities, countering patriarchy and outdated normative dogmas.
Keywords. imagination, human rights, philosophy of law, gender, phenomenon of imagination, authority of the first person, social order, social contract, human rights protection
References:
- Hobbs, T 2000, Leviafan (Leviathan), Kyiv : Dukh i Litera, 606 s.
- Huserl, E 2009, Dosvid i sudzhennia. Doslidzhennia henealohii lohiky (Experience and Judgment. Investigations into the Genealogy of Logic), per. z nim. V. Kebuladze, Kyiv : PPS-2002, 356 s.
- Dekomb, V 2020, ‘Filosofiia pershoi osoby (First-Person Philosophy)’, Filosofska dumka, № 6, s. 16-26.
- Lokk, Dzh 2001, Dva traktata pro vriaduvannia (1689) (Two Treatises of Government (1689)), Kyiv : Osnovy, 265 s.
- Russo, Zh-Zh 2001, Pro suspilnu uhodu, abo pryntsypy politychnoho prava (The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Law), per. z fr. ta kom. Khoma, Kyiv : Port-Royal, 349 s.
- Davidson, D 1984, ‘First Person Authority’, Dialectica, № 38 (2/3), pp. 101–111. Available from : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42970507> [17 November 2025].
- FitzGerald, SA & Carline, A 2021, ‘Gender, Justice and Social Transformation: Grand Challenges and Good Trouble’, Frontiers in Human Dynamics, 3:714703. Available from : < https://doi.org/3389/fhumd.2021.714703> [17 November 2025].
- Kukaine, J & Kārkla, Z 2025, ‘Feral Intimacy: Feminist Transformations Through Solitary Forest Walks’, Women’s Studies, № 54 (6), рр. 636–658. Available from : <https://doi.org/10.1080/00497878.2025.2488795> [17 November 2025].
- Lagrange, B, Van Bauwel, S, Biltereyst, D, Cannizzaro, S, Toms, J, Ağca, Y, Andersson, I, Bjorner, E, Karadimitriou, A, Odstrčilová, K, Papathanassopoulos, S, Risi, E, & Latronico, V 2024, ‘The Future of Gender and Gender EqualityOnline: A Scenario Analysis of Imaginaries on Gender and Social Media Platforms’, Central European Journal of Communication, № 17 (1), pp. 103–124. Available from : <https://doi.org/10.51480/1899-5101.17.1(35).704> [17 November 2025].
- Liberty, F 2023, ‘Dreaming Possibilities: Reshaping Imaginaries with Feminism and Social Change’, International Journal for Talent Development and Creativity, Volume 11, Number 1-2, pp. 137-335.
- Logue, H 2022, ‘“Gender Fictionalism”, Ergo an Open Access’, Journal of Philosophy, 8: 28. Available from : <https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2229> [17 November 2025].
- Olufemi, L 2020, Feminism interrupted: Disrupting power, London : Pluto Press, 148 p.
- Richardson-Self, L 2023, Gender Theory in Troubled Times. Kathleen Lennon and Rachel Alsop, Cambridge, UK : Polity Press, 2020 (ISBN: 978-0-745-68301-0)’, Hypatia, 38 (2), p. e14. Available from : < https://doi.org/1017/hyp.2022.23> [17 November 2025].
- Roelof, L 2024, ‘Simulation Trouble and Gender Trouble’, in Interpersonal Understanding: Transcending Boundaries?, a special issue of Philosophical Explorations, K.Sodoma, E.Ventham & C. Werner.
- Stoller, R 1968, Sex and Gender: the Transsexual Experiment, Hogarth Press, 328 p.
